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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly gaining attention and importance in the 
business world and in the academic and practitioner business literatures (KPMG, 2016).  
Whilst there is no official definition of CSR (Sheehy, 2015), the following one, proposed by 
PWC in 2010, seems to capture many of its important elements: “corporate social responsibility 
reflects a company’s commitment to operating in a socially, economically and environmentally 
sustainable manner, while recognizing the interests of its stakeholders” (PwC, 2010, p. 51).  
In particular, within the broad CSR field, one specific issue is that of disclosing CSR 
information by providing yearly a CSR report. 
CSR reports are voluntarily published by companies or organizations and they deal with the 
environmental and social effects of their core business. These reports also offer an overview on 
firm’s values and governance model and explain how their business strategy is linked and 
integrated with their commitment to a sustainable global economy (Dando & Swift, 2003). 
Despite voluntary standardization of CSR reports, the lack of a real global standardization to-
date is considered as an impediment to further growth of CSR reports and to their reliance and 
credibility (Verschoor, 2012). 
One of the main issue, indeed, is represented by the fact that CSR reports have been harshly 
criticized by prior literature for lacking credibility (Dando and Swift, 2003), being pseudo-
transparent (Coombs and Holladay, 2013), and being poor in quality (Milne and  Gray,  2013).  
This is also noted by Cho, Michelon, Patten, and Roberts (2015, p. 131), which note that the 
practice of CSR reporting, “as with all types of voluntary corporate disclosure . . . is subject to 
concerns regarding the completeness and credibility of the information that is being provided” 
(also see Bouten, Everaert, Van Liedekerke, De Moor, & Christiaens,2011; Bouten, Everaert, 
& Roberts, 2012; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007).  
Credibility is undermined by misuse of CSR reports from companies; Stakeholders often view 
CSR communication as strategic in nature and thus not credible (Elving,  2012). 
To summarize,  CSR  reports  are  accused  of  lack of completeness, of deepening the credibility 
gap (Dando and Swift, 2003; MacLean and Rebernak, 2007) and threatening companies’ 
legitimacy in society, greenwashing accuse may lead to a boomerang effect where corporate 
communication finally reduces corporate legitimacy. (Seele and Gatti 2015). 
To solve this numerous researches argue that third-party assurance on CSR reports can increase 
credibility (see, e.g., Beets & Souther, 1999; Casey & Grenier, 2015; Cohen & Simnett,2015; 




International (2017, p. 5) reports that such assurance has more than doubled among the G250 
in the last 12 years continues to grow with over two thirds (67%) of the Global 250 corporations 
now including outside assurance on their standalone CSR documents. 
However, the frequently voluntary nature of the CSR assurance and the absence of general 
guidelines around the assurance process question the effectiveness of assurance (Wong & 
Millington, 2014). 
Our study aims to examine the CSR report assurance implementation, taking a look at the main 
determinants that lead companies in choosing to use external assurance and the assurance 
impacts, which justify the use of this solution from a company perspective. 
Prior literature already investigated about influential factors (Simnett, Vanstraelen & Chua, 
2009; Smith et al., 2011), variability of content (Deegan et al., 2006), characteristics of 
assurance providers (Power, 1997; Gray, 2010; O’Dwyer, 2011) and characteristic of firms that 
assure  aspects (Manetti and Becatti, 2009). 
Previous studies have also tried to explore potential financial benefits of CSR assurance testing 
if it could reduce information asymmetry, decrease analyst forecast errors (Dhaliwal et al., 
2011), lower cost of equity capital (Casey and Grenier, 2015), and increases firm value (Kuzey 
& Uyar, 2017; Matsumura et al., 2014, Cho et al. 2014), all with poor results. 
From a different perspective, only few researches tried to understand whether CSR reports 
assurance indeed provide companies with reputational benefits. (Alon and Vidovic, 2015; 
Birkey et al., 2016) 
Besides being scarce, these studies have mixed and contrasting results, creating the conditions 
to expand this area of research, which remains insufficiently examined. (Kuruppu and Milne, 
2010). 
The main purpose of this thesis, hence, is to investigate whether assurance of non-financial 
information may increase credibility towards stakeholder and hence bring positive effects on 
corporate responsible reputation. 
Similarly to our reference papers, our work will be based on empirical analysis, using a different 
sample of companies, aims to re-analyse the possible relationship between CSR assurance and 
reputation through the analysis of a different sample, updated data and more accurate proxies 
for variables. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Next chapter will include a background discussion on CSR reports and related assurance, with 





Chapter three will study the theoretical background of CSR report assurance, examining all the 
different theories that would foresee assurance adoption, while chapter four will focus on 
company reputation concept and its proxies. 
Then we’ll perform an extensive literature review on determinant and effects of CSR assurance 
that will take us towards the development of the hypotheses. 
Last sections complete with a description of our exploratory empirical study, results 

























1. CSR REPORT and ASSURANCE 
 
Since our work will focus on CSR report assurance we will start first by understanding what is 
a CSR report and analysing its evolution in the business environment, highlighting the positive 
aspects and the advantages that justify its use, as well as the weaknesses and the main criticisms. 
We’ll also see how legislation, trying to regulate it, also helped to institutionalize and legitimize 
it. 
Then we’ll consider CSR report assurance, approaching the main standards developed and used 
for assurance, the different types of assurance providers that have established in the market and 
the methodologies for measuring and assessing the quality of the assurance. 
While financial statements are those documents which, by law, companies must draw up 
periodically to summarize its financial situation and economic results, CSR reports examines a 
company's performance not only from an economic point of view but also considers social and 
environmental impacts. 
The sustainability report is a document usually published every year, that is addressed to all 
stakeholders, that is to say to all those with whom the company comes into contact: not only 
the shareholders but also the employees, customers, suppliers, authorities, journalists, 
communities and associations on the territory.  
 
 
1.1 CSR Reports  
 
In recent years, organisations worldwide have increasingly adopted varying levels of 
sustainability disclosure, ranging from simple narrative paragraphs within an entity’s annual 
reports to elaborate standalone reports. (Owen and O’Dwyer 2004; Mock et al. 2007).  The 
whole business community is aware of this trend; the rising number of firms issuing CSR 
reports is in fact documented both by academics (e.g. Cho, Michelon, Patten, & Roberts, 2014; 
Peters & Romi, 2015; Unerman, Bebbington, & O’Dwyer, 2007) and accounting professionals 
(KPMG, 2017). 
Since the 90s, following the growing CSR wave, sustainability reporting has been steadily more 
frequent. 
As showed in KPMG’s International Survey on Environmental Reporting, published about 
every three years from 1993 till 2017, the rate of sustainability reporting overall the world has 




sustainability report, while the report rate increased to 28% in 2002. In 2017 three quarters 
(75%) of all observed companies produced sustainability reports (KPMG, 2017). Even better, 
taking as sample the G250 (world’s 250 largest companies by revenue based on the Fortune 
500 ranking) we see that the reporting rate has been stable at between 90 and 95 percent in the 
last four surveys (KPMG, 2017). 
In term of greater transparency and in light of an increased attention toward sustainability, this 
is encouraging, since large global companies are typically leaders in CR reporting and their 







As Figure 1 shows in the past few years CSR have gained importance. 
These is also reflected by the fact that also legislation started to address it and to have a role in 
the regulation of CSR reports. 
The trend toward regulation of non-financial disclosure has reached Europe, exemplified by the 
directive of the European Commission mandating that large companies report on CSR issues 
(EU, 2014) 
Growth in global CR reporting rates since 1993 
Base: 4.900 N100 companies and 250 G250 companies 




Large European companies, indeed, are now required by law to disclose certain information 
about how they operate and manage social and environmental challenges. 
The scope of this measure is to give a support tool to investors, consumers, policy makers and 
other stakeholders in order to evaluate and compare the non-financial performance of large 
companies. 
At the same time, the decree aims to encourage these companies to approach business in a more 
responsible way, moving towards long-term sustainability strategies. 
Specifically, Directive 2014/95/EU directive, which amends the accounting directive 
2013/34/EU, lays down the rules on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by 
large companies. 
Starting in 2018, companies subject to this regulation must therefore include in their annual 
report non-financial statements. 
These new European non-financial reporting rules only apply to large public-interest companies 
with more than 500 employees. This covers approximately 6,000 large companies and groups 
across the EU, including: 
• listed companies 
• banks 
• insurance companies 
• other companies designated by national authorities as public-interest entities 
Directive 2014/95/EU, states that large companies need to publish reports on the policies they 
implement in relation to the following subjects: 
• environmental protection 
• social responsibility and treatment of employees 
• respect for human rights 
• anti-corruption and bribery 
• diversity on company boards (in terms of age, gender, educational and professional 
background) 
Even if all of these aspects must be treated, Directive 2014/95/EU gives companies significant 
flexibility to disclose relevant information in the way they consider most useful, they can use 
international, European or national guidelines to produce their statements, such as: 
• the UN Global Compact 
• the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises 
• ISO 26000 
At this purpose, European commission published in June 2017 its own guidelines to help 




mandatory and companies may decide to use international, European or national guidelines 
according to their own characteristics or business environment. 
CSR performances, whether positive or negative, today find in sustainability reports their 
natural communicating platform. (www.globalreporting.org) 
CSR reporting is an efficient process to measure, understand and communicate a company 
economic, environmental, social and governance performance, and it is helpful to set goals, and 
realize change more effectively. This instrument can help the company itself to understand 
which are the main improvement areas in order to focus on those the efforts. 
These are some of the reasons why EU, as described above, is trying to regulate this subject 
and improve its effectiveness. 
Also, CSR reporting is a complex topic that is interpreted differently, the content and structure 
of the disclosed sustainability information vary substantially. There is confusion in the 
terminology and a need of a unified perception of corporate sustainability reporting. However, 
as a consequence of the confusion in the terminology of sustainability and CSR, there are 
obstacles with defining corporate sustainability reporting and what a sustainability report is 
(Milne and Gray, 2007). It has many names among researchers. CSR  reporting is also known 
as corporate social reporting, environmental reporting, triple bottom line (TBL) reporting, 
sustainability reporting, social accounting and social/environmental reporting (SER), to 
mention some of them (Gray et al, 2014; Deegan, Cooper and Shelly, 2006; Beelde and 
Tuybens, 2015; Higgins and Walker, 2012; globalreporting.org). 
Even though difficult to define precisely it is commonly agreed that CSR  report  should  have  




• suitable form. 
CSR  reporting   means  informing  about  sustainability  performance.  It  helps  to  engage  
stakeholders  and  to  safeguard  company's reputation, its main benefits are (Enablon, 2015):  
• increased informational credibility and reliability, 
• rapid availability of information, 
• personalized communication with stakeholders, 
• enhanced CSR monitoring and management, 





However, with unregulated and unaudited report entities has been given the freedom of 
choosing how and what information to disclose. This also enables companies to use the CSR 
reports in order to emphasize and shape the readers impression rather than to serve as a true 
information source.  
When a CSR report enhances positive social and environmental information, which could 
contribute to misleading and biased report, the phenomenon greenwashing may emerge. 
In this way companies may look as strong corporate citizens even when they are not (Cecil, et 
al., 2013). 
Evidence of this credibility gap is documented by AccountAbility, (2003, p. 3). which 
demonstrated that stakeholders rarely use sustainability information, which is “the key test of 
credible and useful communication”. 
Stakeholders and users of CSR are looking for true and fair information about companies’ 
achievements (Gray, 2000), however, as described above, research has shown that there is room 
for a demand of adding extra credibility.  
CSR reports readers do not have any guarantee that report is complete, that all material issues 
are included (Adams and Evans, 2004), also they cannot trust the correctness of the disclosed 
data and the honesty of the reporting company.  
This because is not so uncommon that companies use persuasive rhetorical strategies to increase 
their acceptability and credibility, to appear reasonable and reinforce good impression (Higgins 
and Walker, 2012).  
Therefore it may happen that companies with poor sustainability performance, in order to give 
a positive impression in social and environmental issue to stakeholders may strive and invest a 
lot in social disclosure, exaggerating the hypothetical results and masking the critical issues in 
order to give a good impression to the external company and improve its reputation (Higgins 
and Walker, 2012). 
This make sustainable reporting and sustainable strategy disconnected from sustainable 
performance (Cho, Guildry, Hageman and Patten, 2012). As evidence of this, some studies 
show that in sensitive industries, such as oil and gas, chemicals and mining, the companies’ 
sustainability reports are relatively high rated while the evidence of enhancements of their 
sustainability performance are inadequate (Milne and Gray, 2007). 
In response to the discussed lack of consistency, completeness and credibility suggested by 
some studies (Adams and Evans 2004; Frost et al. 2005a, 2005b), an increasing number of 
organisations around the world are beginning to provide sustainability reports accompanied by 





1.2 External Assurance on CSR Reports  
 
Following the trend in CSR reporting, external assurance of these reports by independent third 
parties has been rising (Owen & O'Dwyer, 2004). The output of the assurance process, the 
assurance statement, adds to the credibility of the CSR report and improves the stakeholder 
confidence in the reporting company (Carey et al., 2000),  
As a consequence, voluntary external assurance of these documents has also grown (O’Dwyer, 
2011; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; Simnett, Nugent, & Huggins, 2009) with KPMG (2017) 






An assurance engagement is defined by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board (IAASB 2004a, p. 150) as one:  
“. . . in which a practitioner expresses a conclusion designed to enhance the degree of confidence 
of the intended users other than the responsible party about the outcome of the evaluation or 
measurement of a subject matter against criteria.” 
Although CSR assurance is still far to be used systematically, following the practice of financial 
statement assurance, a trend in having CSR reports assured has been noticed. (Deegan, Cooper, 
Shelly, 2006; KPMG 2017). 
However, due to the nature of the data, assurance engagements on non-financial information, 
like CSR reports, cannot guarantee the same level of reliability as on the financial counterpart 
(Park, 2004). 
Growth in independent assurance of CR information 
Base: 3.543 N100 companies that report on CR, 233 G250 companies that report on CR 




Still, the use of external, independent reviews of sustainability management processes and final 
disclosures is intended to increase the robustness, accuracy and trustworthiness of disclosed 
information (GRI, 2013a). The verification of CSR reports is not uniformly labelled, the terms 
used to describe this process vary and include ‘audit’, ‘verification’ ‘external assurance’ and 
‘Certification’ which are used interchangeably (GRI, 2013a). 
 
 
1.3 Assurance Standards  
 
As for audit standards related to financial statements, some standard-setting agencies have also 
developed rules and procedures in order to properly perform an audit for sustainability reports 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, sustainability reporting, still under development, 
was at its beginning and companies were trying to understand what performance indicators 
needed to be included in the reports. 
The lack of a common approach and the uncertainty led to a great variety of content that 
different companies included in their sustainability reports (Gray, 2002).  
Due to this diversity, the assurance approaches were exposed to a lot of variability and 
ambiguity. As a result, assurance reports differed a lot in format (Deegan et al., 2006).  
These resulted in an increasing demand for appropriate guidelines on sustainability 
performance reporting and on sustainability assurance (Wallage, 2000) because companies 
increasingly published sustainability. 
Regarding sustainability reporting, several guidelines were established, the GRI guidelines 
from the Global Reporting Initiative being the most frequently used.  
The majority of N100 (74 percent) and G250 companies (89 percent) are using some kind of 
guidance or framework for their reporting. The GRI framework is the most commonly used, 
with 63 percent of N100 reports and 75 percent of G250 reports applying it. Meanwhile, 13 
percent of N100 and 12 percent of G250 companies are using stock exchange guidelines 
(KPMG 2017). 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has published guidelines and standards for sustainability 
reporting. Since 2000 four generations of the GRI “guidelines” have been published, with latest 
version G4 issued in 2013. The GRI issued its first set of “standards” in 2016 (GRI, 2016), 








In accordance to the processor of this version, the G4 guidelines published in 2013, disclosures 
are partitioned into three categories, namely Social, Environmental and Economical (GRI, 
2013b). The GRI argues that reports containing information on these categories collectively 
embody a thorough CSR report. 
Although the GRI has put a lot of effort in constructing comprehensive guidelines, the 
guidelines are still not generally accepted and of voluntary nature (Hodge et al., 2009). 
While these guidelines significantly improved sustainability reporting, they did not address 
assurance. 
Assurance statements, like CSR reports, are in essence not mandatory globally. Companies 
voluntarily decide whether or not to assure the report and by who.  
However, many scholars, and the GRI itself as well, recently advocated the external assurance 
of CSR reports (Adams & Evans, 2004; GRI, 2013a).  
External assurance statements improve the external credibility and, by examining the internal 
control process, the internal credibility of the CSR information. 
The need for credibility of such reporting to both internal and external audiences has, hence, 
accelerated the development of relevant assurance frameworks (FEE, 2004, 2006; Iansen-
Rogers and Oelschlaegel, 2005; ICAEW, 2004; UNEP Finance Initiative, 2004; Zadek and 
Raynard, 2004).  
In addition to the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines by GRI previously mentioned (which 
should be intended to guide the reporting companies, but are frequently used by assurance 
providers) a number of professional organisations provide direct and indirect guidance on the 
assurance process (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2007). 
Not considering GRI, two international standards stand out in the assurance market, they are 
commonly used by assurance practitioners to provide sustainability assurance.  
Figure 3 
Use of GRI Guidelines vs GRI Standards 
Base: 2.230 N100 companies that apply the GRI Framework 




Firstly, in 2003, AccountAbility, a global non-profit organization, launched the AA1000 
Assurance Standard (AA1000AS) a standard which is specifically focused on sustainability 
reporting. 
Secondly, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), an organization 
for the accounting profession issued the International Standard on Assurance Engagements 
(ISAE 3000) (IAASB, 2011).  
This does not focus precisely on sustainability reporting, but is intended for audits other than 
historical financial information (IAASB, 2013). 
Both standards are voluntary and the overarching themes of these are much aligned, but several 
differences remain present in the approaches that they take: 
The ISAE3000 focuses mainly on the verification of the assurance process itself, it describes 
procedures to check for material misstatements in the scope of the document and ensures a more 
technical explanation, concentrating on the performance information that the client provides. 
The AA1000AS on the other hand is predominantly focused on companies’ stakeholders, 
ensuring the accuracy of the information and accordingly the relevance of the report to the 
intended users of the report. It describes procedures to check whether the sustainably report 





Off course, the initial standards were not perfect, the assurance practice in this field was 
relatively new and improvements were necessary to improve the effectiveness and reliability of 
sustainability assurance (Manetti and Becatti, 2009). Both standards received updates, the latest 
of ISAE3000 dating from 2013 and of AA1000AS from 2008.  
Organization Framework or standard Target 
Global Reportin Initiative 
(GRI) 
Sustainability reporting guidelines All assurance 
providers 
Institute of Social and 
Ethical Accountabiity 
(ISEA) 
AA1000AS Assurance Standard (AA1000AS) All assurance 
providers 
International Auditing and 
Assurance standards 
Board (IAASB) 
International Standard on Assurance Engagements 
(ISAE) 3000 Other Than Audits or Reviews of 









Although the differences in their approaches result in different levels of assurance quality 
(slightly in favour of AA1000AS), both standards have shown to improve the quality of 
assurance significantly (Gürtürk and Hahn, 2015). 
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, several authors questioned the reliability and 
consistency of sustainability assurance. When both standards were established, those authors 
praised the ability of ISAE3000 and AA1000AS to cope with the issues inherent to the 
assurance practice (Dando and Swift, 2003; Adams and Evans, 2004; O’Dwyer and Owen, 
2007). 
While AA1000AS, ISAE3000 and the GRI Guidelines do not directly compete amongst 
themselves, indeed, some assurance providers reference them in different combinations since 
they overlap in the minimum content of assurance.  
As Perego and Kolk noted in their study (2012), it is common for companies to adopt a 
combination of the three guidelines discussed. 
In 2008 the highest preference was for AA1000 in combination with GRI guidelines, followed 
by ISAE3000 in combination with GRI. (Perego and Kolk, 2012) 
According to Perego and Kolk, these trend highlights the willingness to improve the credibility 
of sustainability reports by using all the standards available in order to avoid any gap in their 
disclosure, given the unregulated area of assurance. 
As further demonstration of this is provided by their analysis on the standard choice by different 
type of assurance providers. 
Among the early adopters and consultant firms, the combination of AA1000AS with GRI 
guidelines seems to be the most popular.  
The accounting firms instead seem to draw more frequently on ISAE3000 standards, which is 
not surprising given that these standards stem from an international auditing body (Perego and 
Kolk, 2012). 
Since all can be used complementarily, despite these initiatives, no generally accepted approach 
to assure a CSR report has been established, resulting in a high variety of formats and 
approaches. 
Overall, the current absence of an agreed unique and comprehensive set of standards reduces 
the comparability of assurance statements and causes significant variation between countries in 








1.4 Assurance providers 
 
An assurance statement that offers conclusions on the credibility of the reported information 
can be prepared by several providers, which are commonly grouped in two main categories, 
namely accounting firms and consultancy firms. (Cohen & Simnett, 2015; GRI, 2013) 
The growing variety of potential assurance providers is the litmus test that demonstrate how the 
CSR assurance market is growing. Auditors, consultants and certification bodies offer their 
competences, knowledge and legitimacy to reporting companies in order to enhance the 
perceived quality of the CSR reports. This variety makes the choice of assurance provider not 
an obvious decision. 
To increase the meaning of assurance, Huggins et al. (2011) propose several circumstances in 
which the value of assurance is enhanced. The assurance provider must be independent of the 
company, must have significant expertise on CSR reporting, must have gathered enough 
knowledge concerning the collection of sustainability information and needs to have enough 
quality controls on the process. 
Of the three mentioned above, two professional groups have recently emerged in this market as 
the most common assurance providers; auditing firms and consultants (e.g. Casey & Grenier, 
2015; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; O’Dwyer et al., 2011; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; Perego & Kolk, 
2012; Peters & Romi, 2015; Simnett, Nugent, et al., 2009; Simnett, Vanstraelen, et al., 2009).  
Prior literature argues that accounting providers have an advantage with respect to providing 
high quality assurance given the profession’s body of international standards, ethics, 
independence, and control mechanisms (Pflugrath et al., 2011). 
However, it is also commonly recognised in favour of consulting firms that they have 
significant superior sustainability expertise. The advantage recognised to the auditing firms is 
probably due to the fact that consultants are subject to different standards of professional 
conduct and independence than the accounting profession (Huggins et al., 2011), which are 
usually less strict and tested. 
In any case, the differences between these two types of providers are gradually narrowing, this 
is due to the fact that the different assurance standards to which they rely on are progressively 
aligning and conforming over the years (Michelon et al., 2018). 
While GRI standards are commonly used and taken as reference from all kind of assurance 
providers, the other two standards used to be specifically designed for the two main assurance 




ISAE 3000, developed by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), 
provides guidance for professional accountants when conducting non-financial assurance 
engagements (IAASB, 2013). 
The AA1000AS, developed by AccountAbility, regulates the consulting profession and 
provides similar guidance toward SRA engagements. 
Both standards provide guidance on accepting and performing an engagement, the need for 
independence and competence, the use of materiality, and the importance of evidence gathering 
to support reliability and accuracy, among other issues. 
According to the 2008 report by Corporate Register, 40 percent of the market is assured by 
audit firms, while 27 percent by consultants and the rest by other providers. The organization 
recognized, however, that for big firms (in this case companies of the Global FT500), the 
percentage of auditors’ assurance statements is 56 (Corporate Register, 2008). 
These data differ from the ones collected by GRI which report that in 2013 audit firms assured 
around 60% of the CSR report while consultant reached almost 35% percent of the assurance 
statement (GRI, 2013). 
Speaking about large companies, in 2015 According to KPMG’s survey, 70 percent of the 
assurance statements of the G250 companies were assured by audit firms, 20 percent by 
consultants and the remaining 10 by other providers (KPMG, 2015). 
These trends demonstrate how audit firms and consultants emerged and consolidated and 
established themselves in the market as the main players. Moreover, it is possible to notice that 
audit firms are preferred by large firms, probably because they are already collaborating with 
them for financial statement audits (Perego & Kolk, 2012). 
A peculiarity of sustainable report assurance is that the relationship between the assurance 
provider and the reporting company is more stable in a CSR assurance contract than in a 
financial contract (Simnett et al. 2009). 
This is due to the fact that CSR assurance is much less standardized with respect to the financial 
one and thus it is difficult and more costly to change assurance provider. 
In fact, once the first audit has been carried out, the provider acquires many details and 
information about the company and its approach to sustainability. 
At this point the audits of the following years become easier and less time consuming. 
Continuously changing providers would nullify the mutual knowledge established between 







1.5 Quality of external assurance on sustainability reports 
 
As mentioned before, giving the lack of a single robust CSR assurance framework and due to 
its voluntary nature, this practice has been criticized often in current literature. 
Assurance on sustainability reports can only be effective and valuable when the assurer is 
independent, has expertise, and has quality controls in place over the assurance process, 
otherwise, assurance is not substantively effective (Cohen & Simnett,2015). 
Independence is recognized by literature as one of the crucial requirements speaking about 
assurance, the provider should be able, willing and fearless to provide an adverse opinion if the 
CSR report is misleading, inadequate or distorted (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2007). 
With regard to expertise and competence the standard AA1000AS tries to provide a general 
framework of skills that an assurance provider has to guarantee. 
A company, when choosing the assurance provider, should evaluate if it has competences in 
the following fields “administrative requirements”, “organizational profile”, “technical 
competence and capacity” and “cost implications“ (AccountAbility, 2008). 
One of the reasons of the critics is that quality of external assurance on sustainability reports is 
generally considered not sufficient. This is due to lack of information on the coverage of the 
assurance engagement and a lack of identification of reporting criteria employed (Deegan et al. 
2006; Kamp-Roelands 2002). 
The problems with sustainability assurance can undermine the credibility of the practice of 
assurance on sustainability reports, as well as the credibility of sustainability reports (Perego & 
Kolk, 2012).  
Content analysis of the assurance statement is the most common method for defining quality of 
sustainability assurance in current literature, although, even in this case there is not a single 
guideline that defines the minimum content required for good level assurance, but different 
approaches have been developed (Zorio et al.,2013). 
One of the first research about this issue was conducted by O’Dwyer and Owen (2005) who 
examined assurance statements of European companies in order to examine if assurance 
enhances both transparency and accountability to a company’s stakeholders.  
They performed their analysis by using a framework based on AccountAbility, FEE and GRI 
guidelines with which they examined, through content analysis, whether the assurance 
statements included and addressed the key elements of the above guidelines, namely: 





Their evaluative framework created to define assurance quality is one of the most used, 
although often adjusted or updated, by literature. Their findings suggest that there is big variety 
and big room for improvement, in particular speaking about stakeholder engagement, assurance 
provider independence, materiality and completeness of the reports, often missing in the 
assurance statements. 
Differences in assurance practices were also found for the G250 companies by Perego 
and Kolk (2012) in a more recent research. Revisiting the framework by O’Dwyer and Owen 
in their own codebook, which we will use as well and describe later on, they analysed the 
content and quality of assurance statements and discovered that statement quality has increased 
over the years from 1999 to 2008. Despite this increase however, the average quality remained 
rather low.  
The results of their research are supporting the idea that there is high country specific variation 
in quality, as well as industry variation, while assurance provider affects it only to a limited 
extent. According to their findings for example, more ‘polluting’ sectors have traditionally been 
most active in sustainability assurance, while Accounting firms appear to score only slightly 
better than consultants in terms of quality. (Perego and Kolk 2012) 
However, in this regard, the literature is rather controversial regarding the factors that guarantee 
higher quality. Various studies often link quality of the assurance report to the type of assurance 
provider (Peters & Romi, 2015; Simnett et al., 2009) but there is no consensus in the theory 
regarding the difference in quality of sustainability assurance when considering if assurance is 
provided by accountancy firms or specialist consultants. 
Several studies assume that assurance providers from the auditing profession provide assurance 
of the highest quality because of their well-developed standards, independence requirements, 
and quality control mechanisms in place. 
However, Hodge et al. (2009) argue that sustainability specialists provide more complete, fair 
and balanced assurance statements.  
Finally, Perego (2009) reason that accounting firms have a positive effect on assurance quality 
in terms of reporting procedures and format, while specialists provide higher-quality 
recommendations and opinions.   
Another factor related to assurance quality is the country of origin of the companies. 
It can be expected that being in a country, more stakeholder- or shareholder-oriented, is 
associated with the quality of sustainability assurance. In a stakeholder-oriented country society 
considers that many different stakeholder groups have a legitimate interest in companies’ 
activities and therefore can influence these activities, whilst in a shareholder-oriented country 




creating shareholder value. In these countries, other stakeholder groups have less influence on 
companies’ activities since they have less interest in these activities (Simnett et al., 2009). 
Stakeholder oriented country are more likely to invest in high quality assurance, as it can be a 
tool for strategically managing relationships with stakeholders (Kolk & Perego, 2010).  
Stakeholders oriented country in fact, adopt code law countries, where a corporation is 
considered an organization that has social responsibilities that go beyond achieving economic 
efficiency. A corporation have social responsibilities not only towards their shareholders but 
towards all their stakeholders and therefore, under this influence, is more prone to invest in 
assurance and in its quality. 
This is also demonstrated by Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar (2005) that with their empirical 
research found that firms in stakeholder oriented (Denmark and Norway) have higher levels 


























2. CSR REPORT ASSURANCE: THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Different theories have tried to explain why companies buy external assurance on sustainability 
reports. Research on external assurance on sustainability reports has often taken an agency 
theory perspective (Zorio et al., 2013; Kolk & Perego, 2008). 
 
 
2.1 Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory addresses agency problems between a principal and an agent.  
When it is hard or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent and there are conflicting 
interests, the agency problem can occur, which is the problem that the principal cannot know 
whether or not the agent has been behaving appropriately (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & 
Meckling,1976). The agency problem covers two aspects: moral hazard (hidden action) and 
adverse selection (hidden information), both involve unobservable behaviour by the agent. 
Third party assurance allows for a reduction in information asymmetry and serves as a bridge 
between the interests of the principal and the agent, reducing agency problems and the 
associated agency costs. (Kolk & Perego, 2008). 
The conflict of interest between the principal and agent exists in a non-financial setting as well. 
Stakeholders represent the principals, and the reporting company represents the agent. 
Stakeholders receive information through sustainability reports and assurance statements, 
which should reduce information asymmetry (Power, 1991).  In this case the assurance report 
is a “signal” which would identify “good” companies. 
From an agency theory perspective, the demand for assurance stems from the need to mitigate 
agency costs associated with information asymmetry with stakeholders and resultant loss of 
control due to a lack of observability of managers’ behaviour (Chow, 1982).   
Third party assurance of CSR reports add credibility to the information content and may limit 









2.2 Legitimacy Theory 
 
A different perspective about why companies adopt external assurance is designed by the 
legitimacy theory. According to this scheme, companies are committed to sustainability so as 
to legitimize themselves and improve their reputation. Legitimacy theory explains sustainability 
reporting assurance as strategic, organizational tool for influencing society’s (and stakeholders 
groups therein) perceptions of a company’s legitimacy and for reducing and responding to 
stakeholder pressures and concerns, by demonstrating that the company’s behaviour is 
acceptable. The only way to change society’s perceptions about the company’s legitimacy is to 
provide them of information, hence, disclosures, such as sustainability reports and assurance, 
play a crucial role (Deegan, 2002). 
External assurance on sustainability reports can be explained as a managerial device to reduce 
social pressures and by consequence, for closing legitimacy gaps by influencing society’s 
perceptions of a company’s legitimacy. External assurance is then linked to issues such as 
managing stakeholders, increasing reputation and maintaining legitimacy. 
Legitimacy theory integrates and overlaps with stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory extends 
legitimacy theory by focusing on groups of stakeholders that are influential to a company, and 
on how relationships with these stakeholders can be managed.  
 
 
2.3 Institutional Theory 
 
The institutional approach illustrates how organizations tend to adopt the same methodologies 
and initiatives in order to gain legitimacy (Deegan, 2002; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
This willingness for conformity leads to structural similarities and organizational isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2001).  
Through sustainability assurance firms adapt to the needs of society and seek legitimacy in their 
business environment, that has proper institutional setting (i.e., demand for transparency and 
crucial role of stakeholders) (Doh and Guay, 2006). 
Speaking about sustainability topics, companies strongly depend on the perception and pressure 
of its external stakeholders and hence they react implementing widely accepted structures and 
procedures, because not adopting these practices may lead to a loss of legitimacy (DiMaggio 




Unfortunately, this may lead to less efficiency because each company, under pressure, tend to 
conform to already existent predominant patterns and to be conditioned from social behaviour 
that prevents them to analyse any possible alternative solution that may be rationally or 
economically advantageous. (Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). 
 
This process and this homogeneity of behaviours is known as isomorphism, which can be 
classified into the following three basic categories (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 150): 
“(1) coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy; 
(2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and (3) normative 
isomorphism, associated with professionalization”.  
Even though various theories have been addressed for explaining sustainability report 
assurance, there is no generally accepted theory in current literature.  
What can be noted is that the main reasons why assurance is adopted according to all these 
theories are credibility, transparency, legitimation and reputation enhancement. 
All these intangible resources, as we will see later, are considered increasingly important as 
they allow to avoid costs and create competitive advantage. 
One of the associated problems we will analyse is related to the difficulty in measuring these 
benefits and therefore in analysing the actual value of the assurance statement practice. 
 
 
2.4 Determinants of CSR report assurance demand 
 
Different empirical studies have been recently carried out on CSR assurance thanks also to its 
expansion.  Most of these researches are basically a descriptive analysis of the practice or of 
the factors behind the assurance choice (Birkey et al., 2016). 
In the following paragraphs we’ll analyse different empirical and theoretical studies that tried 
to investigate the reason behind CSR assurance choice and its benefit, making use of the 
theories above described. 
A big community, which includes Standard setters and stakeholders, nowadays often undertake 
that CSR report assurance can support and increase the credibility of CSR reports (e.g. Beets & 
Souther, 1999; Cho et al., 2014; Global Reporting Initiative [GRI], 2013; Hodge, Subramaniam, 
& Stewart, 2009; O’Dwyer, Unerman, & Hession, 2005; Peters & Romi, 2015; Simnett, 
Vanstraelen, & Chua, 2009). 
This belief is based on the commonly accepted understanding, borrowed from the financial 




decreasing accounting errors and inaccuracies contained in the reports. (Michelon, 2018; 
Palmrose & Scholz, 2004; Pomeroy & Thornton, 2008). 
In the frame of the agency theory, with respect to examination of the determinants of CSR 
report assurance Simnett et al. (2009) is seen as the first extensive archival study to assess the 
drivers of assurance. Their sample consists of 2,113 sustainability reports from 867 firms across 
the world during 2002-2004 to examine the impact of both country-level and firm specific 
factors on the choice to have CSR reports assured.  
Simnett et al. (2009) find that companies seeking to enhance the credibility of their reports and 
build their corporate reputation are more likely to have their sustainability reports assured. 
Since an information asymmetry exists between the management of the company, the 
stakeholders and the rest of the public about the sustainability performance of the company 
reducing this information asymmetry is one of the reasons that companies have started issuing 
CSR reports voluntarily (Simnett et al., 2009). Eventually, it is in the companies’ best interest 
to communicate the information in CSR reports in the most effective and credible way and thus, 
to provide third party assurance. 
Their research shows also that larger firms more frequently opt for assurance and that industry 
affiliation resulted significantly related to CSR report assurance choice and that companies 
operating in stakeholder-oriented countries are more likely to adopt CSR assurance. 
However, when U.S. firms were deleted from the sample, stakeholder orientation was no longer 
significant, and as such, Simnett et al. (2009) conclude, in line with Park and Brorson (2005), 
that the need for enhanced credibility appears to drive demand for assurance. 
Cho et al., (2010) always according to agency theory, conclude in their study that language is 
often used to promote the reporting company as a responsible player in society, thereby 
managing stakeholder impressions, here comes into play the audit of sustainability reports, that 
helps identifying several reporting errors and management biases in the content.  
Further research (Hodge et al., 2009; Pflugrath et al., 2011) support the possibilities that 
sometimes sustainable reports may not be totally backed up by reality or by true performances 
thus being used to manipulate the stakeholders and for creating positive impression of the 
entity’s actions and operations not reflecting the reality (Holmlund & Sandberg, 2015). 
Therefore, assurance can play a critical role in verifying the authenticity of what has been 
declared, increasing confidence in the contents of the reports and stakeholders’ confidence. 
Moreover, it allows information asymmetries decrease (Hodge et al., 2009; Pflugrath et al., 
2011). 
Legitimacy theory is another theory on which empirical researches carried out on CSR 




Kolk and Perego (2010) investigate whether country-level and firm specific factors influence 
the demand for CSR report assurance, justifying this relationship through the legitimacy theory,  
With the exception that firm size was not significant for their sample of Fortune Global 250 
companies, results were largely consistent with those reported by Simnett et al. (2009) since 
they found that companies in countries that are stakeholder-oriented and have weak legal 
systems are more likely to buy external assurance (Kolk & Perego, 2010). 
In countries with weak legal systems, assurance can play a substitutive role in controlling 
credibility and quality of sustainability reports, and that companies in stakeholder-oriented 
countries are more likely to buy assurance as a way to manage stakeholder relationships. 
In fact, stakeholder social pressures in these environments is higher and thus companies rely on 
assurance in order to demonstrate the adherence of his behaviour with the expectations of the 
community, thus gaining reputation and legitimacy (Deegan, 2002). 
As in this case, legitimacy theory supports Casey & Grenier (2015), which document a positive 
correlation between assurance and size, but also find evidence supporting a positive relationship 
between profitability and CSRA demand. In addition, they find that firms having a greater 
global presence and higher customer awareness are more likely to assure their sustainability 
reports. A following study by Kolk & Perego (2010) focuses on country-level determinants and 
in correspondence with Simnett et al. (2009) results show that firms domiciled in a stakeholder-
oriented country display a greater demand for assurance. These results are also found by Zhou 
et al. (2016).  
However, whereas Simnett et al. (2009) find a positive relationship between legal enforcement 
and assurance, Kolk & Perego (2010) document a negative relationship, which support 
legitimacy theory for which saying that  
Another important firm-level characteristic is industry affiliation. Simnett et al. (2009) show 
that being located in an environmentally or socially sensitive industry increases the likelihood 
of choosing CSRA. The results demonstrate the demand for assurance is higher among 
companies engaging in more highly visible industrial activity and companies with a larger 
“social footprint” with companies in Mining, Utilities, and Finance all being more likely to 
have their sustainability reports assured. 
That’d be because, as Simnett et al. (2009) explained “companies belonging to industries having a 
greater environmental or social impact are more exposed to environmental or social risks and will have 
a greater need to manage these risks by purchasing assurance to increase user confidence in the 





The mining industry extracts non-renewable resources, the financing industry has a large social 
impact on society and the utilities industry is the industry with the highest production of 
greenhouse gasses (Simnett et al., 2009). Results by Perego & Kolk (2012) confirm that for the 
most polluting firms in their sample the demand for CSRA is the highest. In their first results, 
Casey & Grenier (2015) only confirm the mining industry to show a positive relationship to 
CSRA demand. 
Some studies are also inspired by Institutional theory, as, for example, the one from Perego and 
Kolk (2012). 
Using a panel of 212 firms from the Fortune 500 in the period 1999-2008, they assessed how 
multinationals adopt sustainability assurance practices and how assurance practices shape the 
quality of assurance. 
The results confirmed that country level factors and institutional factors like signals from 
governments and litigations from legal environment determine whether a company will adopt 
assurance (Perego and Kolk, 2012). 
Practical results of institutional theory may be find also in the paper of Gürtürk and Hahn 
(2015), which examining similarities, differences and quality of sustainability reports through 
a deductive content analysis of a sample of 61 assurance statements from Germany and the UK 
published during 2013, found evidence that coercive tendencies in sustainability reports exist.  
They noted, in fact, a homogenous adaptation of the assurance process led by accountants and 
ISAE3000, which seems to result in less extensive assurance statements provided to companies 
(Gürtürk and Hahn, 2015). 
 
 
2.5 Benefits of CSR report Assurance 
 
Previous studies have extensively examined the potential benefits of CSR reporting, but only 
limitedly on the benefits of CSRA (Casey & Grenier, 2015). 
Many empirical researches that analysed possible relationships between CSR assurance and 
positive financial effects have found justification in agency theory. 
Reporting on CSR information has shown to be negatively related to cost of capital and analyst 
forecast errors (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Next to that, CSR reporting seems to positively affect 
firm value (Matsumura et al., 2014; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). 
In an early experimental study using Australian participants (students), Hodge et al. (2009) 
analysed the perceived credibility of CSR reports when these reports were either assured or not. 




CSR reports is higher when it is externally assured. Instead, they could not find any direct 
significant relationship between the level of assurance (reasonable vs. limited) and user 
confidence. 
A subsequent study by Pflugrath et al. (2011) performed a similar experiment with financial 
analysts from the U.S., U.K. and Australia as the participants. The results are in line with the 
findings by Hodge et al. (2009), namely that the perceived credibility is significantly higher 
when the reports are externally assured. 
In addition, Pflugrath et al. (2011) examined whether industry differences influence the 
perceived credibility of the information. Based on the contrast in industries found by Simnett 
et al. (2009), they compare the mining industry to the retail industry and document a significant 
difference in the perceived credibility of CSR information in favour of the mining industry 
when the reports from these two industries are externally assured. 
Irrespective of specific details, companies generally seek to reduce information asymmetries 
and agency costs and increase the credibility of sustainability-related information through 
sustainability related assurance (Hodge et al., 2009; Pflugrath et al., 2011).  
Such increased credibility can, for example, lead to lower equity capital costs (Dhaliwal et al., 
2011) or a greater willingness to invest in a  company (Cheng et al., 2015).  
Whereas Hodge et al. (2009) and Pflugrath et al. (2011) analyse the credibility of information, 
Brown-Liburd & Zamora (2015) focus on the direct relationship to the capital market. This is 
also the aim of the study performed by Cheng et al. (2015), which find that the subjects in their 
experiment are more willing to invest in the respective company when its performance 
indicators are externally assured. 
Furthermore, companies adopt assurance practices because this potentially reduces analysts' 
forecast errors (Dhaliwal et al., 2012), as well as investors' concerns about companies engaging 
in impression management (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Cho et al., 2010) or even greenwashing 
(Lyon and Maxwell, 2011).  In addition to external benefits, companies seek to use assurance 
statements as a tool for checking and improving internal management systems. Prior research 
refers to the inadequacies of existing information systems which potentially increase the risk of 
reporting inaccurate information (Edgley et al., 2010). 
The first archival study on the benefits of CSRA is performed by Casey & Grenier (2015). In a 
U.S. setting, they investigate whether the adoption of CSRA and the type of assurance provider 
are related to the cost of capital, analyst forecast errors and analyst forecast dispersion. Results 





From a different perspective, linked to legitimacy theory, Jones and Solomon (2010) 
interviewed CSR representatives from 20 U.K. firms regarding their perceptions of the need 
for, and benefits of, CSR report assurance. Interestingly, a majority of the interviewees were 
reluctant to support external assurance on the reports, partly because of the practice’s “relative 
current unimportance” (Jones & Solomon, 2010, p. 29). However, Jones and Solomon (2010, 
p. 30) find that “managers are using [assurance] as a way of reinforcing [CSR reporting] as a 
method of giving a favorable impression of the company to outside stakeholders.” Somewhat 
similarly, Edgley, Jones, and Solomon (2010), based on interviews with assurance providers in 
the U.K., identify that CSR report assurance can add value by helping managers and companies 
to manage reputation risk. 
In this regard, our study aims to analyse the relationship between CSR assurance and corporate 
reputation, in particular to assess the possible effect of CSR assurance on reputation and the 
possible relationship between quality of assurance and reputation. 
Credibility is one of the goals collectively mentioned in the literature when it comes to CSR 
assurance, (Simnett et al., 2009, Owen & O’Dwyer, 2005; KPMG, 2008; CPA Australia, 2010), 
as well as transparency (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; Jones & Solomon, 2010).   
In addition to this, another of the objectives mentioned is to remove the suspicion of 
greenwashing, thus legitimizing and reinforcing the social image of the company, this study 
aims to examine how sustainability-related initiatives, in this specific case CSR assurance, are 
actually useful to fill the widely discussed credibility gap and consequently produce positive 
effects on the corporate reputation perceived by the various stakeholders. 
According to Fombrun’s (1996) widely cited definition, reputation is a social construct that is 
based on the perceptions of stakeholders. 
As noted by Kuruppu and Milne (2010), much of the existing social and environmental 
accounting literature carries an underlying untested assumption that sustainability initiatives 
produce legitimating effects, but little is known about the actual influence of such initiatives on 
reputation. 
 
In our opinion the topic is interesting as external stakeholders are influenced by corporate 
reputation when they choose products, jobs, and make investment decisions (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990). 
As previously analysed, it is commonly acknowledged that reputation may be an important 
strength and a strategic intangible asset as it allows to create competitive advantage by 





Empirically testing, therefore, whether CSR assurance is in any way able to improve or increase 
the reputation is interesting to understand whether the reputation can really be considered one 
of the drivers in the choice of managers to adopt assurance. 
This analysis can also be useful to the managers themselves helping them to assess the potential 
benefits that assurance may offer. 
Two researches in recent literature, using legitimacy theory, have tried to analyse the 
connection between assurance and reputation, and on these works our project lays the 
foundation. 
The first we will examine is the paper by Birkey, Michelon, Pattena, Sankara, 2016 “Does 
assurance on CSR reporting enhance environmental reputation? An examination in the U.S. 
context”, which suggest that the benefits of assurance can be directed to the valuation of the 
company.  
Birkey et al. hypothesize and investigate whether external assurance of CSR reports in the U.S. 
is associated with the company's environmental and therefore lead to better outside assessments 
of firms’ environmental reputation using scores as reported by Newsweek magazine in its 2009 
and 2010 rankings of ‘the greenest companies in America’. The reputation measures represent 
one of three different metrics compiled by Newsweek in calculating its rankings. 
Taking as reference a sample of 351 US firm-year observations they tested, through ordinary 
least squares multiple regression analysis whether assurance was linked to corporate 
environmental reputation. 
They assume the following “if firms acquire outside assurance of their reports to enhance the 
credibility of the message being portrayed as argued in much recent research (e.g., Kolk & 
Perego, 2010; Park & Brorson, 2005; Simnett et al., 2009), we would expect the practice to 
impact assessments of its environmental reputation as opposed to being directly related to 
differences in firm value.” 
According to the result of their empirical research we find that assurance is highly associated 
with higher assessments of companies’ environmental reputation as captured by Newsweek 
magazine’s environmental reputation scores. 
Impacts on environmental reputation differ depending on assurance provider type accounting 
firms versus other providers, but the results indicate that having assurance from either type of 
provider is significantly related to increased environmental reputation, suggesting that it is the 
presence of assurance, as opposed to assurer type that impacts assessments of corporate 
environmental reputation. 
Assurance is positively and significantly associated with environmental reputation and 




Their results legitimate their arguments against the idea that assurance is being issued mainly 
to reduce information asymmetries between management and investors (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, 
and Yang, 2011; Casey and Grenier, 2015) 
Rather than being used as a signaling device to corporate investors, CSR assurance reports 
instead are more likely used to enhance the environmental image of the issuing companies (see 
also Cho et al., 2012). Overall, the results suggest that there may indeed be positive outcomes 
associated with the choice to seek assurance on standalone CSR reports, and this may help 
explain why some companies, at least in the U.S. setting, are willing to incur the expense related 
to the practice. This view is supported by KPMG International’s (2011, p. 18) which claim that 
“the business imperative behind CR reporting and its assurance” is reputation.  
The second paper we are going to address is “Sustainability performance and assurance: 
Influence on reputation.”, 2015 by Alon & Vidovic. Also in this work the authors have 
examined the relationship between sustainable initiatives and reputation. 
They take advantage of the legitimacy theory to explain how these sustainable initiatives 
(including CSR assurance) are used by managers as a signal to stakeholders, in order to gain 
credibility and reduce information asymmetries in the legitimation process. 
Specifically, one of the connections examined, of greater interest for our field of research, was 
the correlation between the adoption of CSR assurance and corporate reputation. 
Alon & Vidovic analysed in detail how, sustainability initiatives, among which CSR external 
assurance, can produce reputation-legitimizing effects by filling the credibility gap between 
management and stakeholders. 
Users of the reports, in fact, need to differentiate between companies that use disclosure for 
“greenwashing” and manipulating public perception from firms that are truly committed to 
sustainability (Higgins and Walker, 2012;). 
Taking into consideration a sample of 100 companies, representative of a variety of industries 
and major global brand with high degree of familiarity in big economies such as China, 
Germany, India, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., they measured how the 
Sustainability Perception Score (2011 Sustainability Leadership report) depended in some way 
on the adoption of CSR assurance. 
Using for this purpose covariance-based structural equation (SEM) path analysis the results 
demonstrate that sustainability assurance does not affect corporate reputation and thus that 





They state and verify that, even if the assurance of sustainability reports becomes increasingly 
widespread, stakeholders do not fully recognize its importance and, therefore, the company's 
reputation value increase does not take place. 
According to their conclusion “Assurance appears to be a managerial tool associated with 
internal processes rather than a performance-differentiating signal to external stakeholders” 
since assurance do not have a direct association with reputation. 
The added value that assurance guarantees to the reputation, in fact, has been questioned in light 
of the scarcity of certainties and comparability difficulties caused by the lack of globally 
accepted standards and a wide range of providers offering this service (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; 
Deegan et al., 2006; Manetti and Becatti, 2009; Perego and Kolk, 2012). Kuruppu and Milne 
(2010), in an experimental case study designed to explore decisions of potential employees, 
found that assurance of sustainability disclosure did not impact perceptions of organizational 










3. CORPORATE REPUTATION 
 
The globalised economy raised the attention on the identification of the sustainable competitive 
advantage sources. The search for these advantage drivers broadened arriving to embrace not 
only the tangibles, but also those that are located in the field of intangibles (Schwaiger, 2004). 
This is not surprising, since most United States executives consider corporate reputation one of 
the most influential factor for the firm’s success (Hall, 1992).  
Companies are increasingly becoming aware that intangible assets provide more competitive 
advantages than product-related sources (Rindova, Illiamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). 
During the last few decades the consideration of intangible assets as an important factor in the 
pursuit of competitive advantage has gained an increasing interest in both the academic and 
industry sectors (Barney, 1991). Regarding the industries, in his work Hall observes that CEOs 
consistently rank reputation as one of the most important intangible assets and recommends that 
this issue should receive constant management attention (Hall, 1993). 
Corporate reputation, instead, is a reflection of how the organisation as a whole is regarded by 
its stakeholders (Feldman et al, 2014) and it affects the way various stakeholders behave 
towards the company (Chun, 2005). 
Numerous authors identify corporate reputation as one of the most important intangible assets 
(e.g., Griffith, Ryans, 1997; Parkhe, 1998) playing an increasingly important role in terms of 
firms’ propensity to influence important stakeholder groups, such as financial analysts, 
employees, and customers in global markets (e.g., Eberl, 2010). 
Reputation is an important means by which companies can maintain a sustainable competitive 
advantage and endure a long term relationship with multiple stakeholder groups (Boyd et al, 
2010). 
It can help the organisation obtain trust and credibility in society, which will assist in the 
achievement of its objectives and goals (Mahon and Wartick, 2003). 
For example, a good reputation can improve customer confidence in a company’s products or 
advertising claims (Fombrun & van Riel, 1997) and can increase customer commitment, 
customer satisfaction (Eberl, 2010), word-of-mouth and loyalty (Walsh, Mitchell, Jackson, & 
Beatty, 2009). 
It is an important source of goodwill when dealing with crises; it can constitute a mobility 
barrier (Caves and Porter, 1977) and help the organisation to attract and retain talent in order to 




In fact, a good corporate reputation can limit personnel fluctuation, and increase production 
efficiency via lower salaries and a higher employee motivation. Likewise, negotiation, 
contracting, and monitoring costs may be lower in supplier markets (Bergh, Ketchen, Boyd, 
2010).  
Corporate reputation is a market-based asset resulting in a firm’s improved marketplace 
performance and, finally, in increased stock returns.  
A favourable reputation encourages shareholders to invest in a company; it attracts good staff, 
retains customers and correlates with superior overall returns (Roberts et Al., 2002). 
 
 
3.1 Corporate reputation, a perceptual concept?   
 
Many of these benefits have been criticised, because based on flawed measures of reputation 
or rely on conceptualisations of reputation that are unclear (Chun, 2005).  
Wartick (2002) argued that “one cannot talk about measuring something until one knows what 
that something is” and also that “reputation, be it corporate or otherwise, cannot be argued to 
be anything but purely perceptual”. 
Hence, the objects of empirical research are perceptions of the reputation of an entity.  
Perceived corporate reputation can be understood as an individual’s impression of a firm, and 
this individual perception of reputation is based on a “collective assessment of the company’s 
ability to provide valued outcomes to a representative group of stakeholders” (Fombrun et al. 
2000) meaning that the individual takes into account what he thinks a collective (e.g. ‘the 
public’; ‘the stakeholders’) think about the company. 
The term ‘corporate reputation’ is then defined as the individual’s estimation of an assumed 
aggregated perception of all stakeholders towards all salient characteristics of a firm (Barnett, 
Jermier a. Lafferty 2006). 
 
 
3.2 Corporate reputation determinants  
 
It has been cited in the literature, that corporate reputation is affected by many factors as for 
example personal reputation (Musteen et al., 2009), the reputation of the leader, management 
or the owner affects the reputation of an organization. Many studies have highlighted the 




extent that the leader can account for up to 48% of the organization’s reputation (Grupp and 
Gaines-Ross, 2002). This was clearly the case for many organizations such as Apple, General 
Electric. Accordingly, Grupp and Gaines-Ross (2002) emphasize the importance of managing 
the leaders reputation in terms of: credibility, integrity, and high quality communications.  
Industry reputation also affects corporate reputation. In most cases this is the result of the work 
of a few organizations which affect all organizations within the industry. This is beneficial for 
those organizations that are not competitive enough which gain from a good industry reputation 
(Mahon 2002).  
Finally, the reputation of a country also affects corporate reputation. This includes the effect of 
country-of-origin on the reputation of corporations (Mahon, 2002). Reputations are self-
validating in the sense that beliefs derived from one source are confirmed by other sources. This 
evaluation could be based on stakeholder’s direct experiences with a company and other forms 
of communication and symbols from a company from other people and objects. Further, it is 
formed over time by repeated impressions of the corporate image whether positive or negative 
(Gray and Balmer, 1998;). Other elements that have been cited to affect corporate reputation 
include (Le Roux, 2003): 
1) Organizational ethics 
2) Financial performance 
3) Shareholder value 
4) Corporate branding activities 
5) Marketing mix activities 
6) Public relations 
7) Relationships with stakeholders 
 
Getting back to the problem above introduced, most researchers and practitioners in the field 
of reputation management will agree that “to be managed, corporate reputations must be 
measured“ (Fombrun 2002), preferably by taking into account the target group of reputation 
management: the stakeholders of the firm. While awareness for the need of measurement 
prevails, there is by far no consensus on how to measure: “The biggest hurdle in making the 









3.3 Corporate reputation measurement  
 
Reputation is usually operationalized as a judgmental perception leading to either a positive or 
negative evaluation of the firm’s reputation (Dollinger et al., 1997). 
As a consequence, an evaluation of corporate reputation has to result in certain values on a 
metric scale between the binary counterpoints ‘good reputation’ or ‘bad reputation’. 
Porter’s (1980) analysis of generic strategies raised the first attention about corporate 
reputation, but Fombrun and van Riel’s (1997) work started a new era of reputation studies 
based on the Corporate Reputation Review and the identification of several key research 
problems related to the theme. Fombrun (2005) provides the following definition of corporate 
reputation: 
A corporate reputation is a collective representation of a company’s past actions and future 
prospects that describes how key resource providers interpret a company’s initiatives and assess 
its ability to deliver valued outcomes. 
From Fombrun’s research comes to light that the lack of research was partially due to a problem 
of definition, as corporate reputation was defined in different ways by different schools of 
thought (Fombrun et Al., 1997). 
The concept of reputation has appeared in a large number of contexts, in both the academic 
literature and popular use. For example, often for the public, firms offering warranties are often 
said to be cultivating reputations for high quality, advertising campaigns are designed to create 
a reputation for trendiness, forecasters are said to have reputations for accuracy, or advisors for 
giving useful counsel (Mailath et al., 2006). 
In literature numerous theories have been used to examine the concept of corporate reputation, 
theories that often continued to use the following list of constructs as synonym to ‘corporate 
reputation’: image, identity, prestige, goodwill, esteem, and standing (Wartick, 2002). 
Depending on the field of study each of the previous terms has been offered as 
• a broader term that encompasses reputation, 
• an important component within reputation, 
• the equivalent of reputation. 
In other words, these terms are intended as bigger than, smaller than, or just the same as 
corporate reputation. Despite the fact that reputation assumes different names in different 
context and consistently with Wartick cited study, one common feature should be considered: 
reputation and its literature synonyms all refer to a perceptual representation of a company’s 




constituents when compared with other leading rivals. The key points of this definition are the 
following: 
• corporate reputation has a perceptual nature,  
• corporate reputation is the result of the aggregation of the perceptions of all stakeholders 
• corporate reputation is comparative. 
Considering how wide is the stakeholder concept it is possible to deduce that organisations will 
be likely to have different reputations with different stakeholder groups. The evaluation criteria 
stakeholders use to judge an organisation’s reputation will differ depending on the particular 
stakeholder’s expectations of the organisation’s role. Is important to notice that stakeholders’ 
expectations are dynamic, and thus likely to change over time (Hanson, Stuart, 2001). 
Additionally, as an organisation’s reputation increases, so do stakeholders’ expectations 
(Mahon, 2002) 
Corporate reputation is not an “easy variable to accurately measure” (Geller, 2014). Multiple 
disciplines studied the key aspects of the definition of corporate reputation (Rhee, Valdez, 
2009) and various heterogeneous approaches have been used to measure the corporate 
reputation construct. Both, definitions as well as measuring tools have been lively discussed 
with regard to their usability and validity (Horn,2014). Basically, every measurement approach 
is linked to a definition of what actually is measured (Wartick, 2002).  
Academic studies on measuring corporate reputation can be generally classified into: (1) single-
faceted generic measures of corporate reputation, and (2) multi-faceted specific measures of 
corporate reputation. In the case of single-faceted generic measures, all stakeholders are asked 
generic questions regarding their perceptions about the overall reputation of a corporation. 
However, researchers realized that using a single-overall measure for corporate reputation did 
not incorporate the specific measures by which stakeholders form their overall perception of a 
corporations’ reputation. Moreover, using single-item measurement limits the organization’s 
ability to identify the specific elements of a corporation which bring about a positive reputation 
and which elements result in a negative reputation. Thus, a series of measures for corporate 
reputation have been proposed from a multi-specific approach. 
Geller observes that “although some rankings are verifiable and replicable, they tend to give 
disproportionate importance to a few stakeholders, resulting in a biased perception as other key 
stakeholders are excluded from the analysis” (Geller, 2014). In this scenario fall one of the 






3.4 Fortune’s indicators  
 
One of the most commonly used standardized quantitative approaches of measuring corporate 
reputation are the several ranking lists published by Fortune magazine as for instance Fortune’s 
Most Admired Companies. Fortune’s AMAC index (Hutton, 1986) was the first reputation 
ranking of US firms on a global level.  
Fortune’s American ratings AMAC and its global counterpart, the GMAC, are published by the 
North American magazine Fortune. Until 1997 the Fortune’s AMAC was the only reputation 
ranking available on a global level, but it was restricted to US firms. The AMAC indicator rates 
1000 U.S. manufacturing and service firms (Fombrun et al. 1999), while the GMAC evaluates 
1,000 leading North American companies, complemented with 500 international companies. 
Both indexes rank the organisations in terms of financial results, best performance and turnover. 
The indexes have later been further developed into the World’s Most Admired Companies 
(WMAC) index, which is annually reported by the Fortune magazine. 
The evaluation group includes executives, managers and financial analysts of each sector who 
are familiar with the companies that are being evaluated.  
They are asked to evaluate a set of eight criteria on an eleven-point scale ranging from 0 = 
‘poor’ to 10 = ‘excellent’ (Fombrun a. Shanley 1990). The criteria (indicators) are Quality of 
Management; Financial Soundness; Quality of Products and Services; Ability to Attract, 
Develop, and Keep Talented People; Innovativeness; Responsibility for the Community and 
the Environment; Long-term Investment Value, Wise Use of Corporate Assets.  
The overall ratings are obtained through the aggregation of the evaluations by attributes made 
by the respondents.  
Numerous authors criticize the AMAC index. Sobol, Farelly, and Taper (1992) note the lack of 
a precise construct definition and a sound theoretical grounding of the eight categories. Owing 
to the construct’s unidimensional operationalization, Fombrun et al. (2000) maintain that the 
index cannot capture all facets of corporate reputation, which calls the scale’s content validity 
into question. A further point of concern is that the AMAC relies on single items to measure 
constructs, which respondents very likely perceive as heterogeneous (Sarstedt & Wilczynski, 
2009). It is generally held that abstract constructs require the use of multi item measures, 
because ‘‘most constructs, by definition, are too complex to be measured effectively with a 
single item.’’ 
Other authors observe that the index is subject to a strong financial halo effect (e.g., Davies, et 
al. 2004). For example, Fombrun and Shanley (1990), show that the index mainly captures a 




stakeholders’ overall evaluation. Specifically, the AMAC index does not take the expectations 
of other stakeholder groups such as customers, employees, and the general public into account 
(e.g., Fombrun et al., 1999; Schwaiger et al., 2004). While the AMAC index marks the 
beginning of reputation research and offers the largest reputation database to date, most 
researchers agree that it is a rather narrowly focused measure of corporate reputation (e.g., 
Eberl, 2010). 
Our empirical study reveals that all measurement approaches (with the exception of the AMAC 
index) achieve comparable levels of convergent validity, whereas the RQ scale and Schwaiger’s 
(2004) approach are the preferred measurement approaches in terms of criterion validity. (M. 
Sarstedt 330 et al. 2013)  
 
 
3.5 Reputation Institute’s indicators  
 
In 1999, Fombrun et al. highlighted some limitations of the indexes used to measure corporate 
reputation, especially: (i) the lack of content validity and (ii) the restricted perceptions elicited 
by the surveys, both points due to the fact that the group of respondents is constituted by 
corporate leaders and financial analysts (Fombrun et al., 1999). Recognising a growing need by 
both practitioners and academics for a better conceptual and empirical tool for assessing and 
managing reputation and to overcome the available methodologies’ inadequate representation 
of all stakeholders, the Reputation Institute launched a global project in 1998 to understand and 
measure the diverse factors associated with corporate reputation (Fombrun et al., 2015). The 
first measurement instrument that resulted from the exploration was the Reputation Quotient. 
The Reputation Quotient is an index based on surveying US population and which aims to find 
out which companies are liked and respected by individuals, and for what reasons.  
Fombrun et al. (2000) developed the RQ, which has frequently been used in prior research 
studies (e.g., Porritt, 2005). The approach comprises 20 items representing the following 
reflectively measured corporate reputation dimensions: (1) emotional appeal, (2) products and 
services, (3) vision and leadership, (4) workplace environment, (5) social and environmental 
responsibility, and (6) financial performance. Researchers acknowledge that the RQ is 
conceptually superior to the AMAC due to the inclusion of the emotional appeal factor, which 
captures how stakeholders feel about a firm (e.g., Davies et al., 2004). 
RQ successively has been exploited as a reference in order to create the four-attribute 
RepTrak® Pulse index which was developed in 2005 and used to create a separate measure of 




This evolved into The full RepTrak® System, which was created in 2006 as a replacement for 
its predecessor  to provide executives with an analytical instrument that could be used, not only 
to track and assess stakeholder perceptions of companies, but that would also enable a more 
comprehensive understanding of the underlying informational drivers of reputation that elicit 
emotional attachment” (Fombrun et al., 2015).  
The system is based on measuring a company’s overall reputation using the RepTrak® Pulse 
and decomposing that emotional attachment into an underlying set  of dimensions and 
attributes, and predicting  their effects on stakeholder support.   
RepTrak contains new dimensions and new attributes from the Reputation Quotient. The 
evaluation is held in the form of a poll in different countries, with respondents looking at one, 
two or three companies that they are familiar with, continuously throughout the year, grading 
it on a scale from 1 to 7. 
Unfortunately, since RepTrak is a patent, it is not disclosed, and thus clear, how the construct 
measure is developed and how the reputation rating-scores are calculated. 
Within RepTrak, 23 reputation indicators are combined to form seven core dimensions 
(products and services; innovation; workplace; governance; citizenship; leadership; and 
performance) which represent the building-blocks of the so called ‘RepTrak Reputation  Score 















Hypothetical model of corporate reputation  
Source: Fombrum et al, 2015. “Stakeholder Tracking and Analysis: The RepTrak® 




For benchmarking purposes, the RI offers a so called ‘RepTrak Pulse Score’. 
RepTrak is a standardized measurement approach used mostly for commercial purposes. 
 
Among the various measures for corporate reputation, from the moment it was created the 
Reputation Quotient became the most popular measure, as it overcomes the aforementioned 
critical aspects of the Fortune's indicators (Fombrun et al., 2015). It was one of the first 
accredited measures for reputation and many subsequent measures for reputation are based on 
the Reputation Quotient. Wartick (2002) claims that the Reputation Quotient is a good measure 
for reputation as it is broad and generic enough that makes it applicable to most stakeholder 
groups and many cultural contexts. Groenland (2002) highlighted that the Reputation Quotient 
satisfies the psychometric properties, and the practical experience in many different commercial 
settings. This increases the confidence in the usefulness of the Reputation Quotient. The results 
of Groenland’s (2002) qualitative study to validate the dimensions of the Reputation Quotient 
highlighted that all six dimensions of the Reputation Quotient were supported as relevant for 
measuring corporate reputation. 
 
 
3.6 CR RepTrak 
 
Reputation institute (https://www.reputationinstitute.com/), once a year, also publish the results 
of The Global Corporate Responsibility RepTrak Study. 
This study conducted annually by Reputation Institute, is based on close to 230,000 individual 
ratings across the 15 largest economies. To be included in the study, which is conducted every 
year from January to February, respondents had to be familiar (>20 percent overall familiarity 
and >20 percent familiarity in 5+ markets) with the companies they were asked to evaluate and 
to have an informed opinion regarding the state of their reputation, as well as the corporate 
responsibility metrics.   
CR RepTrak score in fact is specifically derived from 3 out of the 7 dimensions commonly 
considered from RI, (Citizenship, Governance and Workplace) and reflects the performance of 
companies only on the basis of the social related attributes. 
The importance of these dimensions, as showed in figure 5 below, is really close to 40%, 
meaning that the weight of the CSR reputation in the calculation of the general Reptrak score 





















According to RI the importance over time of these dimension is overall stable, with the 







They are the three most important drivers among companies with a poor reputation; and are 
among the key drivers for companies with weak to strong reputations. 
Source: https://www.reputationinstitute.com/ 
CR Dimension Importance Over Time 






It is only when a company reaches an excellent reputation and delivers on CR that other 







4. HYPOTESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
As previously anticipated the objective of our research is to investigate if corporate reputation 
enhancement could be one of the determinants that bring companies to adopt external assurance 
on CSR reports. 
We’ll examine, through an empirical model, if CSR report assurance may increase credibility 
towards stakeholder and hence bring positive effects on corporate responsible reputation. 
 
4.3 Hypotesis  
 
In light of the contrasting results of the two cited papers from Birkey et al. (2016) and Alan and 
Vidovic (2015), which we find the most renowned in the literature regarding CSR assurance 
and Reputation, since cited respectively in 36 and 29 published studies on the subject 
(https://scholar.google.com/), our work aims to re-analyse the possible relationship between 
these two. 
Our first hypothesis is thus similar, in the form, to those of the previous works. 
Hypothesis 1 will be researched in ‘Model 1’ and will be referred to as such.    
 
H1. Is Company Responsible Reputation score positively associated with the presence of 
assurance statement in the last CSR report? 
 
Based on the cited literature we expect that the relationship, if any, should be positive.    
The operationalisation of the independent and dependent variables will be discussed in the next 
section. The control variables used will be analysed in the next chapter as well. 
 
Due to its voluntary nature, the quality of CSR reports is not guaranteed. External assurance 
should improve the credibility of these sustainability reports. However, the quality of external 
assurance on sustainability reports varies considerably. 
Assurance statements should answer two questions, namely: “Does this report give an account 
of the company and its performance that readers can rely on?” and “Is the report complete, 
accurate, honest and balanced in its portrayal of the organisation?” (Adams & Evans, 2004, 
p. 101). Assurance quality thus refers to the reassurance of the completeness, accuracy, honesty 





Therefore, assurance statements on sustainability reports that fully answer these questions can 
be regarded as of high quality. 
As described before the quality of external assurance on sustainability reports is generally 
identified as poor, and the practice of external assurance, lacking a single robust framework due 
to its voluntary nature, has been criticized often in current literature. One of the key problems 
is management’s control over the assurance process, which poses restrictions on assurance 
providers, makes independent enquiry difficult, and makes assurance statements “virtually 
worthless” (Gray, 2000, p. 251). For instance, management can control the scope of the 
assurance engagement, which makes it hard for readers of assurance statements to know if key 
aspects of the sustainability report are assured. Another issue is assurance providers’ lack of 
identification of the reporting criteria that reporting companies use to produce sustainability 
reports, which makes it impossible to indicate if the report is in compliance with these criteria, 
and leaves assurance statements’ conclusions open to readers’ individual interpretation and 
possibly misunderstanding (Deegan, Cooper & Shelly, 2006). These problems undermine 
accountability and transparency to stakeholders. Moreover, great variation in quality of 
assurance statements on sustainability reports has been found (e.g. O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005). 
The potential for external assurance to be used as a strategic device instead of being motivated 
by accountability and transparency to stakeholders, calls to a need to focus on the quality of 
assurance statements on sustainability reports. 
The conflicting perspectives may be due to the earlier mentioned problems with external 
assurance on sustainability reports, which can lead to low quality assurance. 
There’s the possibility that the quality of the assurance can be determining in ensuring greater 
credibility and transparency to stakeholders and therefore positively influencing corporate 
reputation. 
Our research therefore wants to go further and focus also on whether the details contained in 
assurance statements (assurance quality) play a role in the firm sustainability reputation. 
Accordingly, our Second hypothesis will be the following: 
 
 












To test the hypotheses formulated, an initial sample of 100 global companies that are included 
in the Global CR RepTrak® 100 in 2018 was used. 
We decided to use this sample because it includes a good variety of global companies, 
belonging to different markets, industries and countries, all provided with a measure of their 
CSR reputation (Global CR RepTrak® 100, 2018). 
Choosing companies that have the highest CSR reputation was likely to result in a sample of 
companies that report on sustainability and possibly buy external assurance on their 
sustainability reports.  
In fact, to be included in our analysis, companies, above being listed on the Reputation institute 
ranking in year t (2018), had to have issued a CSR report in year t – 1. 
To determine if a company publishes a sustainability report, the Corporate Register 
directory was consulted. Corporate Register is the world’s most comprehensive online database 
of non-financial reporting, with over 109,000 reports profiled from over 18,600 organisations. 
However, not all existing reports are included and therefore a sole reliance on their database is 
not sufficient since some companies’ reports might be omitted. Therefore, when the Corporate 
Register database did not provide search results for any of the 100 companies, the company 
website was consulted in order to see if the company published sustainability reports 
Additionally, to be part of the sample companies needed to have ESG score available in 
Thomson Reuters and have data for financial control variables available on Thomson Reuters 
Eikon. 
After omitting firms for which data was missing the eventual sample consists of 85 firms.  
For hypothesis two a subsample is used as it only includes firms that had external assurance, 
which led to a 49 observations subsample. 
The presence of external assurance on sustainability reports was checked for each company. 
All assurance statements were retrieved from the CSR reports or from the company websites. 









  Observations 
Global CR reptrak (Initial sample of firm observation) 100 
Less:  
        Not publishing CSR report in 2017 (standalone or integrated) 9 
        Control Variable not available (on Eikon) 6 
Total Observations Available (H1) 85 
Less:  
        Not having Indipendent Assurance statement 36 
Total Observations Available (H2) 49 
Table 2 
 
The following GICS sectors were represented: Communication Services, Consumer Staples, 
Health Care, Information Technology, Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, Financials. 
Also, it is interesting to note that in the final sample, 16 countries are represented, with Japan 
and United States as the most represented in the sample; together they amount to above the 50% 
of the firms.  
As the assurance market is an expanding market, taking the most recent year will provide 
interesting results, especially in comparison to earlier studies.  
The reason to take one year only stems from additional difficulties with assessing multiple 
years. By analysing multiple years, one must take into account whether or not the firm had 
assurance in all these years, whether the level remained the same, whether the provider 
remained the same and in which year the firm had taken assurance for the first time. This would 
make data gathering harder and interpretation of the results more difficult. 
 
 
5.2 Dependent variable 
 
To measure CSR reputation, we use the CR RepTrak issued by Reputation institute and above 
described. 
Since we want to assess the possible correlation between assurance and reputation and we 
considered in our analysis CSR report issued during the 2017, we take as reference the 2018 
CR RepTrak score, which resulted from surveys collected by the Reputation Institute during 
January and February 2018 and hence, when all CSR report and related external assurance were 




As previously explained 2018 CR RepTrak score is constructed on an annual survey based on 
more than 200,000 individual ratings across the 15 largest economies.  
CR RepTrak score in fact is specifically derived from 3 out of the 7 dimensions commonly 
considered from RI, (Citizenship, Governance and Workplace) and reflects the performance of 
companies only on the basis of the social related attributes. 
Reputation scores (CorpRep) for the sample companies ranged from 71,9 to 63,1 with a mean 
(median) of 65,50 (65,4). The top three rated companies were Google (Alphabet Inc), Walt 
Disney, and the Lego Group. 
 
 
5.3 Independent variables 
 
5.3.1 Assurance 
We obtained data on whether firms obtained external assurance of their sustainability reports 
from Corporate Register, an online directory of sustainability reports, or, if not available, from 
the company website. We define our assurance (CRASS) variable as equal to 1 if the company’s 
sustainability report is assured by a third party and 0 if it is not. Forty-nine companies in our 
sample had their sustainability reports assured. 
 
5.3.2 Assurance quality  
Following prior research (e.g. Fonseca, 2010; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; Perego & Kolk, 2012), 
the quality of assurance statements was determined by means of content analysis. 
We therefore conducted a content analysis on all 49 external assurance report available in our 
sample (companies listed on the Reputation institute ranking in year t (2018) that issued a CSR 
report in year t – 1). 
The codebook by Perego and Kolk (2012) was used, which is the most recent instrument for 
measuring the quality of assurance statements on sustainability reports, and can be found in 
appendix A. It includes minimal requirements for high quality assurance statements as 
prescribed by the GRI, IFAC and AccountAbility.  Based on the evaluation framework by 
O'Dwyer and Owen (2005), who introduced the minimum requirements of a high quality 
assurance statement, Perego and Kolk made a few improvements to the codebook in order to 
avoid bias. Finally, the codebook resulted in 19 aspects or ranking criteria, the possible range 
of scores obtainable from the content analysis goes from zero (lowest quality level) to 27 




result of assessing the various items on the basis of existence/mentioning/reference of a specific 
item in the sustainability assurance statement (Perego & Kolk, 2012). 
The empirical examination and the content analysis of the assurance statement is the most 
common method to understand and define the quality of sustainability assurance in the current 
CSR assurance literature (Gürtürk & Hahn, 2016; Perego & Kolk, 2012), this approach is 
consistent with the assurance quality index suggested by O'Dwyer and Owen (2005) and Zorio 
et al. (2013). 
Hence, based on the content analysis performed using the rules and the criteria cited above and 
listed in appendix A, we create an index referred as “ASSQ”. 
 
 
5.4 Control variables 
 
This research investigates the association between the presence (or the quality) of an assurance 
statement in sustainability reports and the corporate reputation of the firm. However, a lot of 
factors could influence this relation and excluding them in this research could imply that good 
reputation is wrongfully attributed to the presence of assurance on sustainability reporting, 
thereby harming the internal validity of this research. Therefore, several control variables are 
added to rule out their possible impact on the relation between the independent and dependent 
variable. The below stated control variables are often included in similar researches using OLS-
regressions. 
We hence control for several factors that might be expected to influence environmental 
reputation, factors that we selected after a careful review of the literature (see for comparison, 
Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Cheng et al., 2014).  
The first control variable we’ll analyse centres on assessments of the sample companies’ actual 
ESG performance.  
We retrieve sustainability performance data from the Eikon database.  
Thomson Reuters ESG Scores are designed to transparently and objectively measure a 
company's relative ESG performance, commitment and effectiveness across 10 main themes 
(emissions, environmental product innovation, human rights, shareholders, etc.) based on 
company-reported data. 
In line with Birkey et al. (2016) we would expect companies with worse ESG performance to 
be ranked lower in terms of CSR reputation. Consequently, we predict a positive association 




We then considered a few financial variables that could condition the relationship analysed. 
Our main financial control variables included Size, following Simnett et al. (2009), who find 
that large companies are significantly more likely to have their sustainability reports assured 
compared to small companies, consistently, several studies (e.g., Brown & Perry, 1994; Brown 
et al., 2010;Craig & Brennan, 2012; Guidry & Patten, 2010) note that, presumably owing to 
visibility, survey assessments of corporate reputation are positively associated with firm size. 
We used as its proxy the 2017 revenues of each company, obtained from Eikon to account for 
firm size. 
The relation could as well be affected by the leverage ratios of companies as well.  
In fact, companies with less debt in the capital structure have more resources to invest in non-
profit making activities (Matsumura et al., 2014). 
The leverage ratio LEV is defined as the 2017 ratio between total debt and total equity and is 
included in the OLS-regression as a control variable. 
We also control for firms’ financial performance in the form of 2017 return on assets (ROA) as 
our fourth control variable. Guidry and Patten (2010) document that the environmental 
reputation score in 2009 was positively associated with financial performance, a finding 
consistent with investigations of other measures of CSR reputation (see, e.g., Brown & Perry, 
1994; Brown et al., 2010). In addition, Waddock and Graves (1997) argue that better financial 
performance potentially results in the availability of slack resources providing an opportunity 
for companies to invest in CSR activities, which in turn could be expected to influence 
environmental reputation. 
As explained before, also industry affiliation can be regarded as determinant with a view to 
adopt assurance. However, given the small number of industries represented in our sample, and 
considering the low number of sample companies belonging to the so-called "sensitive" sectors 











5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
CR REPTRAK REPUTATION SCORE (CorpRep) 85 63,10 71,90 65,53 1,59 
ESG Score (ESGScore) 85 44,73 96,16 76,28 9,84 
Total Revenue (FY2017, Milion USD) (Size) 85 1.733 247.775 53.344 50.760 
Total Debt to Total Equity, Percent (FY2017) (LEV) 85 0,00% 1190,14% 134,30% 176,17% 
ROA Total Assets, Percent (FY2017) (ROA) 85 -4,58% 38,15% 7,19% 5,98% 
Assurance Statement Score (ASSQ) 49 13 26 18,43 3,21 
Sample frequencies:       










Table 3 and 4 show descriptive statistics for the sample companies.  
From the 85 companies of the sample 49 of those companies had their sustainability reports 
assured in 2017, which is 57,65% of the reporting companies.  
As indicated sample company CSR reputation scores range from 63,1 to 71,9 with a mean of 
65,53. On average, our sample companies are large (Mean sales: 53.344 Milion $) and 
profitable (aver-age ROA = 7,19%) with only 5 companies (6%) unprofitable. 
Finally, the mean Eikon ESG score for our sample firms was 76,28 based on a range from 
44,73 to 96,16. 
 
SPEARMAN CORRELATION MATRIX 
 CorpRep CRASS ROA LEV Size ESGScore 
CorpRep 1,0000      
CRASS -0,1563 1,0000     
ROA 0,1286 0,0557 1,0000    
LEV -0,1208 0,2096 0,0466 1,0000   
Size -0,2040 0,0342 0,0761 0,2039 1,0000  
ESGScore -0,0239 0,1586 0,0030 -0,0308 0,1058 1,0000 
The table displays the Spearman correlation analysis. The highest correlation possible is 1,0000, the lowest -
1,0000.  
Table 5 
CSR assurance report 2017  Freq. Percent 
0 = No 36.00 42.35 
1 = Yes 49.00 57.65 






Table 5 contains the Spearman correlation matrix, which is a measure that describes the 
dependence of two variables. The Spearman correlation coefficient is a number from 1 to -1 
which indicates how well two variables correlate. The closer to 1 or -1, the more perfect the 
variables correlate, while a correlation coefficient of 0 means no correlation at all.  
A Spearman correlation matrix is performed, as a first indication of association between the 
variables in Hypothesis 1 and 2 but no particular correlation between the variables is noted 





In order to analyse the collected data and to test our hypotheses we used ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression. 
An OLS-regression is used to draw a conclusion on the significance of an association between 
two variables, it creates a linear regression line based on a number of observations. In doing 
this, it tries to estimate and minimize the residuals between the observations and the regression 
line. The significance of an association between two variables depends on the distance between 
n observations and the regression line (the absolute value of the residuals), where a bigger 
distance means a larger difference between the observation and the expected value of that 
observation, indicating whether observations can be predicted.  
Hypothesis 1 is tested using an OLS-regression analysis with Corporate reputation as 
dependent variable and a dummy variable CRAss as independent variable.  
The model, with expected relations in parentheses after each independent variable, is stated as:  
 
Mod.1: CorpRep =α0 + 𝛽1CRAss(+) + 𝛽2ESGCcore(+) + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(+) + 𝛽4LEV(-) + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴(+) + 𝜀 
 
Where: 
- CorpRep is a measure of Corporate reputation, proxied by the 2018 CR RepTrak score 
published on corporate reputation website, which resulted from surveys collected by the 
Reputation Institute during January and February 2018.  
- CRAss shows if the company’s sustainability report in 2017 is assured by a third party (= 1) 
or if it is not (= 0). 
- ESGCcore is equal to 2017 Thomson Reuters ESG Scores. 




- LEV is the leverage, which is measured by the long-term debt on total assets (2017). 
- ROA is a measure of profitability, assessed by the return on assets, equal to net income divided 
by total assets (2017). 
 
This first model hence, measures the effect of having an assurance statement on the CSR 
corporate reputation and is tested including the whole sample (85 observations available). 
The second model instead aims to measure the effect that different level of assurance quality 
has on the CSR corporate reputation. This model is run on a subsample, as it only includes firms 
that have externally assured their CSR report. In this way, results of this model will show the 
isolated effect of the assurance quality level on Reputation. 
The following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equation was estimated: 
 
Mod.2: CorpRep =α0 + 𝛽1ASSQ(+) + 𝛽2ESGCcore(+) + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(+) + 𝛽4LEV(-) + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴(+) + 𝜀 
Where: 
- ASSQ is the quality of assurance on sustainability reports as measured by content analysis 





5.6.1 Regression results 
 
 
REGRESSION RESULTS MODEL 1 
Variable Predicted relation Coefficient Estimate t-Statistic 
_cons None 66,32*** 93,09 
CRAss (+) -0,479345 -1,34 
ESGScore (+)  0,001251 0,17 
Size (+) -0,013032 -1,82 
LEV (-) -0,003613 -0,49 
ROA (+)  0,010139 1,44 
      
N 85     
*Denotes significance at p < .10 
**Denotes significance at p < .05 








REGRESSION RESULTS MODEL 2 
Variable Predicted relation Coefficient Estimate t-Statistic 
_cons None 65,76*** 39,93 
ASSQ (+) -0,022584 -0,33 
ESGScore (+) 0,003615 0,24 
Size (+) -0,025075 -1,60 
LEV (-) 0,002029 0,13 
ROA (+) 0,018490 1,18 
      
N 49     
*Denotes significance at p < .10 
**Denotes significance at p < .05 




Tables 6 and 7 shows the results of the regression analyses, distinguishing between regression 
analyses with assurance adoption (model 1) and assurance quality (model 2) as independent 
variables.  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that companies that adopt CSR assurance are more likely to have bigger 
Company Responsible Reputation score. 
The results in the regression analysis performed do not support this statement and in reverse, in 
contrast to the expected relationship a negative not significant association between CSR 
assurance presence and Reputation is highlighted for this sample. This means that the first 
hypothesis has to be rejected. 
Regarding the control variables, three of them showed the expected positive (ESGscore, ROA) 
or negative (LEV) relations while Size was not in accordance with our forecast. 
Anyhow, none of these relations is statistically significant and we should say that, according to 
these results, none of the control variables really influence Company Responsible Reputation 
score. 
With regard to hypothesis 2 we can draw the same deductions. The quality level of the assurance 
is not positively correlated to reputation. Here as well thus there is no significance in the 
relationship, leading to the conclusion that neither assurance adoption nor the its quality affect 
Corporate reputation. 
For the above reasons also hypothesis two is not supported and therefore rejected. 








The following observation may be drawn according to our results since both of our hypothesis 
resulted as not supported by the statistical model and hence rejected. 
Firstly, since no significant relationship is detected, we find that assurance is not linked to 
company responsible reputation. 
This observation is in line not only with Alon &Vidovic but also with Kuruppu & Milne, (2010) 
who examined the effects of external assurance on potential employees’ decisions finding that 
assurance did not affect perceptions of organizational legitimacy, nor reputation.  
In order not to incur in the same boundaries highlighted by Alon et al, we did not limit to 
examine the general signal of whether the firm obtained third-party assurance but we also 
conducted a content analysis for each of the assurance statement of our sample to be able to 
assess their quality. 
The quality assessment is the result of assessing the various items on the basis of 
existence/mentioning/reference of a specific item in the sustainability assurance statement. 
Using the codebook (Perego & Kolk, 2012) we were able to assess the amount and the extent 
of details contained in the assurance statements, translating them in a “quality” score. 
This score was useful to verify any relationship between the completeness of the assurance 
statements and firm responsible reputation and test our second hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, also in this case the hypothesis is rejected and the result confirmed that the 








Criticisms have been raised around the effectiveness of assurance, but on the other side, theory 
and early evidence suggest that assurance may be beneficial to firms. As Birkey et al. report, 
nowadays there is no agreed detailed consensus about the added value that CSR assurance may 
bring, even if, as before described by many researchers, the incidence of assurance in CSR 
reporting is progressively growing. 
One relationship that literature tried to detect was between assurance and market valuation. 
Ballou, Heitger, and Landes (2006), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), for example state that assurance is 
mainly a vehicle for reducing information asymmetries between managers and investors, 
however, one of the main study, by Cho et al. (2014), fail to find any significant relation 
between the assurance and market valuation.  
Birkey et al. argue that “rather than being used as a signaling device to corporate investors, 
standalone CSR reports instead are more likely used to enhance the environmental image of the 
issuing companies”. Cho himself, in a later research concludes that standalone CSR reports may 
instead be used to enhance the social and environmental image of the firms (see, e.g., Cho, 
Guidry, Hageman, & Patten, 2012). Accordingly, Birkey et al. test whether external CSR report 
assurance is related to higher assessments of companies’ environmental standing and they find 
a positive statistically significant relationship. 
A similar study was conducted by Alon and Vidovic (2015) which investigated sustainability 
reporting and its assurance influence on companies’ reputation from a signaling theory 
perspective. Contrarily to Birkey et al they find that sustainability assurance does not affect 
reputation directly and consequently conclude that “assurance seems to function as a managerial 
tool to improve internal processes and to signal their commitment to sustainability issues in-
house, rather than a signal to external stakeholders.” 
Since there is no wide consensus in the literature regarding these relationships, our intent with 
this work is to empirically test the possible correlation ourselves. 
This thesis aims to investigate if CSR assurance and/or its quality affect company responsible 
reputation in order to understand whether assurance and related quality may lead to reputational 
benefits for companies. Whether reputation is really affected by assurance should be an 
interesting food for thought for companies, managers and assurance providers. Having a 
specific purpose, the assurance would be justified and could be developed and designed to 
maximize its result, addressing itself more and more specifically to support the company's 
reputation and credibility. Managers and companies would be able to assess more accurately 




choices in terms of external assurance adoption.  The assurance providers themselves, if the 
above was confirmed, could focus their marketing and advertising campaigns in order to tempt 
companies to invest in assurance to gain intangible credit among the various stakeholders. 
According to the results above described we can therefore consider that our research is 
consistent and confirm the conclusion of Alon & Vidovic (2015). 
Responsible reputation it is not affected by CSR assurance, nor by the quality of the assurance. 
The results of our study should be interpreted in light of the following limitations. 
The survey data were obtained from published reports, and the data collection process could 
not be verified, additionally, measuring quality of external assurance on sustainability reports 
is not an easy task. 
We focused on large multinational companies domiciled in developed countries, thus 
the observed relationships may not hold for other types of firms. Also, we do not find that firm 
size affects the reputation scores. One potential explanation is the lack of variation in the size 
of the firms in the sample, as all firms are large and well established. 
To conclude, we would like to point out that, since our proxy for corporate responsible 
reputation is derived by opinions and answers of many different stakeholders group, we can 
consider that one of the reason behind this result is that there is insufficient familiarity with 
third-party assurance on the part of the external users, which are the  majority of the 
stakeholders considered. Also, as signaling theory does note that for the signal to be effective, 
the receiver needs to be aware of what to look for (Connelly et al., 2011) it is possible that they 
may not fully understand the process and implications of third-party assurance. 
In this context the lack of global standards and different types of assurance providers, which 
leads to inconsistent approaches to assurance does not help users to confer it utility and to 
appreciate its benefits, resulting in poor use and confidence of this instrument. As highlighted 
by Perego and Kolk (2012), in fact, these structural deficiencies potentially “undermine the 
credibility of such novel verification mechanisms”. Lack of consistent standards and provider 
differences make it difficult for non-specialists to interpret what assurance statements mean in 
terms of sustainability performance (e.g., Manetti and Becatti, 2009; Perego and Kolk, 2012).   
This reasoning could also explain the different findings described by Birkey et Al (2016). 
The reputation scores used in their research (Newsweek) are based on surveys and opinions 
from academics, professionals and other environmental experts, a narrower sample which of 
course is more specialized and more familiar with CSR reporting and assurance. Reputation, as 
discussed, is defined as the individual’s estimation of an assumed aggregated perception of all 




Finally we may conclude that, if companies and assurance providers are willing to use CSR 
assurance as a tool useful to increase credibility and reputation they should focus then on 
external stakeholders, making them more acquainted with the CSR audits and rethinking the 







Ranking criteria Definition  Scale (tot 27 point) 




2. Addresse Party to whom the assurance statement is 
formally addressed (either in title separate 





Addressee is internal or “the readers” 
Stakeholder mentioned in the addressee 












5. Report date Reference to the date at which the 





6. Responsibilities of 
reporter 
Explicit statement that reporter is 
responsible for preparation of report 





7. Responsibilities of 
assuror 
Explicit statement that the reporter is 
responsible to express an (independent) 






8. Independence of 
assuror from reporting 
organization 
Statement expressing the independence of 
the two parties involved (a 1 is assigned as 
soon as the word(s) independent or 
independence appear anywhere in the 
assurance statement or its title. Thus, 
remarks such as “this is an independent 







Reference or mere statement 
expressing that independence can 
be looked up on the internet 
9. Impartiality of 
assuror towards 
stakeholders 
Assuror’s declaration of impartiality 





Reference (a remark that such a declaration can 
be made available on request or reference to an 
internet site already qualifies for a 1) 
10. Scope of the 
assurance engagement 
Assurance statement coverage (a 1 
should be assigned if anywhere in the 
assurance statement the coverage of the 





11. Objective of the 
assurance engagement 
Objective to be achieved through the 









Review, limited assurance, independent opinion, 
independent assurance, external verification, 
external assurance or validation 
Reasonable Assurance or reasonable and limited 
assurance (e.g. two different levels of assurance 
for different parts of the report) 
12. Competencies of 
assuror 
Description of the professional skills that 
enable the engagement team to conduct 







Statement claiming competency (but no 
explanatory note) or mere reference to an 
internet site 
Explanatory statement of competencies based 






Ranking criteria Definition Scale (tot 27 point) 
13. Criteria used to 
asses evidence and 
reach conclusion 
A statement that makes reference to 
particular criteria against which the 
sustainability report has been prepared 






Reference to publicly unavailable criteria 
Reference to publicly available criteria (e.g. 
internally developed criteria that are published 
anywhere in the report or GRI) 
14. Assurance standard 
used  
Standards used which govern the work 
of the assurance provider (e.g. 





Reference to publicly unavailable criteria 
Reference to publicly available criteria 
15. Summary of work 
performed 
Statement explaining the actions taken to 





16. Materiality Degree of information provision on 
materiality level. If the conclusion states 
that the report is in conformance with the 
AA1000 principles (Materiality, 
Completeness and Responsiveness) this 















Reference limited to a broad statement (e.g. 
“covers all material aspects” or “…in all material 
respects…”) but also negative statements 
claiming that assuror has not undertaken any 
work to confirm that all relevant/material issues 
are included  
Reference and explanation of materiality setting 
or reference limited to a broad statement and 
stakeholder perspective introduced (e.g. “issues 
material to stakeholders have been considered”) 
Reference, explanation of materiality setting and 
stakeholder perspective introduced  
17. Completeness Statement expressing that all material 
aspects are covered by the report. If the 
conclusion states that the report is in 
conformance with the AA1000 
principles (Materiality, Completeness 
and Responsiveness) this qualifies for a 








18. Responsiveness to 
stakeholders 
Statement referring to the organization’s 
procedures (or lack of them) for 
identifying stakeholder interests and 
concerns. If the conclusion states that 
the report is in conformance with the 
AA1000 principles (Materiality, 
Completeness and Responsiveness) this 












Statement expressing the result of the 
assurance exercise. If there is no general 
conclusion but the conclusion solely 
refers to the 3 principles of AA1000 
(Materiality, Completeness and 










Mere statement expressing the opinion of the 
assuror (e.g. “XY’s report is a fair presentation of 
XY’s CSR performance”). A 1 should be assigned 
only if the conclusion consists only of one 
sentence  
Explanatory statement (more than one 
sentence, but recommendations for 
improvement are not considered part of the 
conclusion)  
Base: 4.900 N100 companies and 250 G250 companies 
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